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Abstract—Lawmakers and regulatory bodies around the
world are asserting Network Neutrality as a fundamental
property of broadband Internet access. Since neutrality
implies a comparison between different users and different
ISPs, this opens the question of how to measure net
neutrality in a privacy-friendly manner.
This work describes a system in which users convey
throughput measurements for the different services they
use to a crowdsourced database and submit queries testing
their measurements against the hypothesis of a neutral
network. The usage of crowdsourced databases poses
potential privacy problems, because users submit data
that may possibly disclose information about their own
habits. This leaves the door open to information leakages
regarding the content of the measurement database.
Randomized sampling and suppression of small clusters
can provide a good tradeoff between usefulness of the
system, in terms of precision and recall of discriminated
users, and privacy, in terms of differential privacy.
Index Terms—Differential Privacy; Network Neutrality;
I. INTRODUCTION
The Network Neutrality principle aims at pro-
tecting and maintaining open, uninhibited access
to legal online content without broadband Internet
access providers being allowed to block, impair, or
establish fast/slow lanes to lawful content.
In case of non-equal treatment of data traffic
transmitted over the Internet, it is possible that
an ISP is discriminating a user with respect to a
service; it means that the performance experienced
by the user is worse than the network performance
experienced by other users accessing the same ser-
vice with different providers.
Several policy-makers, most notably the FCC
in the USA and the European Parliament in the
EU, forbid discrimination by user or by service.
Although the definition of Network Neutrality im-
plies some measurement mechanism, there is no
consensus on what are the mechanisms to detect
whether some form of discrimination is in place. Re-
searchers have proposed various approaches based
on passive measurements campaigns by large con-
tent providers, on active measurements by public or
private entities [1][2], or on crowdsourced measure-
ments collected by the users [3][4][5]. In these last
approaches, users submit measurement reports to a
central server, which runs algorithms to verify the
presence of discrimination by the ISP.
The usage of crowdsourced databases poses po-
tential privacy problems, because users submit data
that may possibly disclose information about their
own habits. Therefore, it is necessary to put in place
mechanisms that limit how much the collected data
can be used to infer information beyond the intended
meaning of the data collection.
This paper considers a scenario in which a user
agent running on the user device collects passive
measurements of the user activity and sends reports
to a server in the form of a tuple of attributes.
Periodically, the server makes a snapshot of the
collected data and stores them in a database. Upon
reception of a new tuple, the server provides the
binary answer, “false” if there is no evidence of
net neutrality violation, or “true” if that specific
measurement might be due to net neutrality viola-
tion. Multiple measurements are then necessary to
achieve statistical significance.
There are two interfaces which require sanitiza-
tion for privacy protection: the data collection step,
in which users submit their data, and the query
response, in which the answer is calculated and pro-
vided to the users. This paper focuses on the second
step and provides the following new contributions:
(1) the proof that a compliance test over a clustered
database of subsampled data provides privacy in a
differential sense; (2) the evaluation of the tradeoff
between privacy and effectiveness in identifying net
neutrality violations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides a literature review on works
about net neutrality and differential privacy; Section
III introduces definitions and assumptions made to
develop our system and provides a description of
the database construction, the sanitization algorithm
and the attack scenario; Section IV evaluates the
privacy bounds provided by our proposed system
in general and in case of Gaussian model; Section
V discusses the validation system and the obtained
results in terms of precision and recall; Section VI
sums up the main contributions of the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A few systems issuing the evaluation of network
neutrality have recently been proposed in the scien-
tific community: The principle of the NANO system
[5] is to establish a causal relationship between an
ISP policy and the observed degradation of perfor-
mance for a service using only passively collected
data. It introduces the problem of privacy but it
does not define the concept theoretically proving
its guarantee. Unlike NANO, we provide a formal
definition of differential privacy in a crowdsourced
scenario.
Neubot [2] is an open source application, vol-
untarily installed by the users, that measures the
characteristics of transmissions across the Internet.
This tool does not detect explicitly net neutrality
violations, but collects results from clients and con-
tinuously controls their performance. In addition,
Neubot focuses on confidentiality that is guaran-
teed by the encryption of data. Instead, we focus
on privacy preservation through an anonymization
mechanism.
Glasnost [6] is a system that improves network
transparency by enabling ordinary Internet users
to detect whether their ISPs apply differentiated
treatments to flows of specific applications. The aim
of Glasnost is making any differentiation transpar-
ent to users using throughput as measure of flow
performance like in our system, but it does not deal
with privacy issues.
DiffProbe [7] is an active probing method that
aims to detect discrimination when it actually affects
user traffic. Also in this work there is no privacy
definition and the considered metrics for assessing
discriminations are delay and loss, but not connec-
tion throughput.
The notion of differential privacy was first in-
troduced by the seminal work by Dwork et al.
in [8]. Differential privacy aims at guaranteeing
that the removal or addition of a single item in
a statistical database has negligible impact on the
outcome of any query on that database. The author
gives a formal definition of differential privacy as a
measure of the tradeoff between the precision of the
aggregate data and the probability of identifying the
contributions of individual data inside the aggregate.
In this paper, we will apply a sanitization ap-
proach similar to the one proposed in [9], which
shows that a k-anonymity-based sanitization algo-
rithm can satisfy differential privacy when preceded
by a random sampling of the database entries.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Basic Mechanism
We assume that each user sends a tuple q contain-
ing the following attributes: date and time, location,
type of application and/or server, ISP, subscribed
broadband service tier, and one or more measure-
ments evaluating the service quality (e.g. through-
put, latency, or jitter).
We adopt the basic assumption of NANO [5], i.e.
that, all other things being equal, the majority of
ISPs complies with net neutrality rule. Therefore,
a net neutrality violation can be detected by com-
paring the performance received by the subscribers
of a given ISP to the performance received by
the subscribers of all other ISPs, after taking into
account the effect of any confounding factors.
Many factors other than differentiated treatment
may affect the performance of a particular service
Fig. 1. The attack scenario
or application. For example, a service may be slow
due to overload at a particular time of day or
it might be supplied in a location characterized
by worse performance. Similarly, the performance
might depend on software or hardware, or other
network peculiarities.
Consequently, we consider ISP as the treatment
variable, any performance measurement, in partic-
ular the throughput, as an outcome variable, and
any other parameters such as time, location and
network speeds as the confounding variables. A
confounding variable (or simply confounder) is one
that correlates both with the considered treatment
variable (i.e., the ISP) and the outcome variable (i.e.,
the performance).
Similarly to [5], we use stratification to gather
confounding variables together. Stratification places
measurements into clusters such that all the samples
in each cluster have “similar” values for the con-
founding variables. Inside each cluster, the treatment
and the outcome variables can be considered inde-
pendent of the confounding variables. The proce-
dure that maps samples into clusters is called gener-
alization. In this work, we consider data independent
generalization, meaning that the clusters are defined
before the data are collected. In particular, we define
upper and lower thresholds for each confounding
attribute and we define a cluster as the set of
all instances whose confounding attributes all fall
within the same threshold bounds.
We consider a semi-honest adversary A. The
adversary adheres to the protocol rules, but it can
freely choose its input and store all received mes-
sages with the aim of inferring additional informa-
tion w.r.t. what is implied by the knowledge of the
query answers.
In particular, as depicted in Figure 1, the ad-
versary wants to ascertain whether an arbitrarily
chosen tuple xr is present or not in the database
X . Conversely, the database is assumed to be an
honest entity.
B. Database Construction and Sanitization
A database X is a collection of N data rows
x1, . . . , xN containing elements drawn from a public
universe U . We assume that the content of X does
not change in a given time frame. Each data row
consists of a set of L values taken from a domain
D = D1 × · · · ×DL.
The database users interact with the database by
submitting queries q1, . . . qQ, which are themselves
drawn from U . The database answer is a binary
value representing whether the submitted tuple is
compatible or not with the tuples already in X .
Similarly to [5], the parameters in domain D are
divided in three classes: treatment, confounder, and
outcome. For the sake of simplicity, we will con-
sider the case in which there is a single treatment
variable D1 and a single outcome variable DL. The
other variables are the confounders.
A Data Independent Generalization (DIG) func-
tion g(x) takes as input a tuple from U and asso-
ciates it to a cluster of similar tuples. For the sake
of simplicity, we assume that each cluster can be
labeled with a natural number. It is worth noting that
the generalization function g(x) takes into account
neither the treatment nor the outcome variables. We
assume that the clustering parameters are given.
Each cluster is also associated to a compliance
interval, calculated from the outcome field of the
tuples in X that are part of the same cluster and
have a different treatment variable. In practice, we
compare the user own measurements to measure-
ments from similar users having a different ISP.
What is the most accurate way to calculate a
compliance interval is a matter of study and, in
general, it is necessary that a significant number of
repeated measurements fall outside the compliance
interval before one can conclude that some kind of
non-neutral traffic treatment is in place. In this paper
we calculate the compliance interval for cluster i as:
[Mi(X)− σ,Mi(X) + σ] where Mi(X) denotes the
sample mean of the outcome field of the tuples in
X that fall in cluster i (i.e., with equal values of
confounders), and σ is a system parameter control-
ling the tradeoff between detection, precision and
recall. The query q returns False (0) if the outcome
field of q falls inside the compliance interval, True
(1) otherwise.
We consider the following sanitization building
blocks:
• a β-sampling mechanism that samples database
X with probability β;
• a Data Independent Generalization (DIG) func-
tion g(x) that divides into intervals the con-
founding variables in order to obtain clusters
in which samples have equal values for the
generalized attributes;
• a k-suppression mechanism, which eliminates
from X all the clusters having fewer than k
tuples.
First of all the database X is sampled through
the β-sampling algorithm, i.e. each tuple is dropped
with probability 1−β. After that, the generalization
mechanism g(x) takes as input the sampled version
of X and produces a new dataset linking user’s
measures to a cluster based on common confound-
ing variables. Finally we apply the k-suppression
algorithm to remove any cluster containing less than
k tuples and we obtain the new database X ′.
C. Privacy Definition
We evaluate privacy in the Differential Privacy
model [10]. Let A(q,X) the result of submitting
the query q to X . The system consisting of the
database and the sanitization algorithm provides
(, δ)-differential privacy if, for all q, xr and b, the
following holds with probability no smaller than δ:
e− ≤ Pr[A(q,X) = b]
Pr[A(q,X\xr) = b] ≤ e
 (1)
where xr is a tuple from X and X\xr is the database
X with the tuple xr removed.
IV. PRIVACY EVALUATION
The effectiveness of the Sanitization Algorithm in
providing privacy depends on the underlying data
model. In this Section, we identify the conditions
that guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy under suit-
able assumptions. We consider the scenario of a
single query. In case of multiple queries, exploiting
the composition theorem [10], the sanitization algo-
rithm provides (Q,Qδ)-differential privacy, with Q
the number of queries submitted to X .
A. General Case
In the general case, we assume that, for all the
tuples in each cluster, the outcome variable is drawn
from an unknown distribution with probability den-
sity function fγi(x), where i is the cluster label.
We state the following theorem. In the appendix,
we provide the main reasoning. The full proof is
available in an extended version of the paper.
Theorem 1. The system consisting of the database
and the sanitization algorithm provides (, δ)-
differential privacy with
 = ln (Ni(1− β) +K′) ∀ Ni ≥ k (2)
δ =
[
1−
k−1∑
l=0
Bi(Ni, β, k)
]
k−1∑
j=0
Bi(Ni − 1, β, k)+
k−1∑
l=0
Bi(Ni, β, k)
[
1−
k−1∑
j=0
Bi(Ni − 1, β, k)
]
(3)
The constant Ni is the size of cluster i and the
constant k is the minimum cluster size set by the
suppression algorithm. The constant K′, defined in
(8), depends on fγi(x) and approaches zero as Ni
grows. The function Bi(Ni, β, k) is the binomial
cumulative density function for k successes out of
Ni trials with success probability β.
As Ni grows, K′ becomes negligible and  can
be bounded as:
 = ln (Ni(1− β)) ∀ Ni ≥ k (4)
Figure 2 shows the upper bound of  in (4) for
different values of β and Ni, which assumes the
value of minimum cluster size k.
Figure 3 depicts the value of δ in (3) with
increasing level of anonymization and cluster size
Ni = 100. The probability δ keeps small values for
significantly small sampling probability β ≤ 1%.
However, when Ni ∼ k/β we underline that δ
assumes higher values, in this case it is necessary to
force a limit in the number of queries Q otherwise
the privacy is hardly guaranteed.
B. Gaussian Model
Theorem 1 proves that the sanitization algorithm
provides privacy, but the  bound resulting from (4)
and plotted in Figure 2 is of limited practical use,
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Fig. 2. Upper bound of the privacy parameter  in the general case.
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Fig. 3. Privacy parameter δ in the general case for a cluster of
Ni = 100 elements
since it is too large and becomes even larger as k
grows. A more useful estimation can be obtained by
making stronger assumptions on the distribution of
the data in the cluster. We replace in (5) the well
known probabilistic functions of a Gaussian distri-
bution with mean value µ and standard deviation σ,
once both concerning downloading and once both
concerning video streaming, the two service types
introduced in Section V.
We use Monte Carlo method based on random
sampling in order to obtain numerical results. Thus
we generate multiple realizations of X and X\xr
and we apply the sanitization mechanism with dif-
ferent value of β and k in order to obtain the
epsilon bounds in Figure 4. We average the different
simulations and we verify the ratio in (1) for several
queries q choosing the maximum value.
At this point, in Figure 4 we plot the decreasing
trend of the value of epsilon and the resulting gain
in privacy level versus the increasing anonymization
level.
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V. NUMERICAL ASSESSMENT
A. Validation Method
We evaluate the privacy-precision tradeoff by
applying the technique described in this paper to
the measurements provided by SamKnows during
the project Measuring Broadband America [1].
The raw data collected from the measurement
database for each active metric are made avail-
able by month in tarred gzipped files. We use
the September 2013 data validated by SamKnows
through a work of anomalies’ removal, such as IP
address out of valid range or throughput inconsistent
with the service tier provisioned by the ISP.
We exploit files related to download speed, web
browsing, video streaming and voice over IP. For all
these services we consider the following attributes:
unit profile identifier, time test finished and running
total of throughput. Then, information regard ser-
vice tiers (ISP, download speed, upload speed) and
regard position (longitude, latitude) is included in
unit profile and unit census block files, respectively.
Based on the above mentioned attributes, fifty
millions of database entries are classified in different
categories, as shown in Table I.
We try to identify when service performance dif-
fers across ISPs but confounding factors are equal.
A big challenge in designing such a system is
to identify the confounding factors and create an
TABLE I
VARIABLES AND GENERALIZATION RULES
Treatment variable
ISP –
Confounder variables
time hour and day of the week
longitude areas of five degrees
latitude areas of five degrees
up steps of ten megabit per second
down steps of ten megabit per second
service four different services
Outcome variable
throughput –
environment where all confounding factors are equal
or independent of the ISP or service performance.
In order to validate our detection mechanism we
randomly select an ISP and trim the corresponding
throughput measurements similarly to a policing
algorithm. We set at one Megabit per second the
threshold at which throughput is truncated according
to a feasible policing procedure.
Then, we randomly partition the dataset in train-
ing set (which includes 85% of the available tuples)
and a test set. The training set becomes the database
X , which is then divided in clusters and sanitized in
order obtain the new database X ′. We set a boolean
variable ground truth to True in case of alteration
or to False in case of neutral network. Conversely,
the attribute category assumes value True in case
of detection of a probable net neutrality violation
or value False when the measure falls within the
compliance interval.
B. Results
We start applying the algorithm to the full
database, with no sanitization, in order to assess
the baseline performance of the detection technique.
We label this case as “baseline” in the following
figures. The resulting precision, defined as the ratio
of the correct detections of net neutrality violations
to the total detections, depends on the service. In
case of the download service, it is about 58%, while
for the video streaming service it is about 29%.
These figures, which are not very good in absolute
terms, refer to a single query. In order to declare
that a violation is indeed occurring, it is necessary
to collect multiple queries over multiple days. In
turn, the number of necessary queries depends on
the extent of the violation. The correct identification
of the observation interval is out of the scope of this
paper.
The recall in the baseline scenario, defined as
ratio of the number of detections by the number
of violations in the data, is more than 99% for the
downloading service and about 55% for the video
streaming service. The relatively low performance
for the video streaming service is due to the fact
that the service comprises heterogeneous streams
with different speeds that depend on the receiver
device and on the resolution of the video stream.
For a more accurate detection of violations in the
video streaming service it is therefore necessary to
consider other confounding variables such as the
resolution of the stream. Unfortunately, these vari-
ables are difficult to obtain and were not available
in our data. Nevertheless, since our the goal is to
study how sanitization impacts on the recall, we
will show the impact of the various sanitization
parameters with respect to the baseline scenario,
which represents the best result.
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Fig. 5. Precision versus the sanitization parameters for the down-
loading service
Figures 5 and 6 show the precision for the down-
loading and the video streaming services, respec-
tively, versus the sanitization parameters β and k.
The figures also show the baseline precision. As
the sampling parameter β grows, the precision also
grows, with bad performance for β ≤ 0.1% and with
results very similar to the baseline for β ≥ 10% for
all the values of k.
Figures 7 and 8 show the recall for the download-
ing and in the video streaming services, respectively,
10−3 10−2 10−1
0
10
20
30
Sampling parameter β
Pr
ec
is
io
n
[%
] k = 10
k = 20
k = 30
k = 40
k = 50
baseline
Fig. 6. Precision versus the sanitization parameters for the video
streaming service
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Fig. 7. Recall versus the sanitization parameters for the downloading
service
versus the sanitization parameters β and k. The
performance of the sanitization algorithm in terms
of recall is similar to the performance in terms
of precision, with good results for β ≥ 10% and
significant recall loss for smaller β. In addition, for
10−3 10−2 10−1
0
20
40
60
Sampling parameter β
R
ec
al
l
[%
]
k = 10
k = 20
k = 30
k = 40
k = 50
baseline
Fig. 8. Recall versus the sanitization parameters for the video
streaming service
large β the impact of k is negligible, but for small
values of β we notice increasingly worse results
for larger k. This is mainly due to the somehow
arbitrary decision to declare that a measurement
is not a violation if the relevant cluster has been
suppressed and the number of suppressed clusters
is large if β is small or k is large. A different
assumption, however, would negatively impact the
precision, which is already critical.
Finally, with data at our disposal, we prove the
existence of finite values of β, between 10%− 1%,
and finite values of k, near 30, that make possible
to reach both good quality parameters, in terms of
precision and recall, and good privacy bounds,  and
δ, of the detection technique.
VI. CONCLUSION
We describe an algorithm for the crowdsourced
detection of possible net neutrality violations. We
also consider the application of a sanitization tech-
nique of the collected measurements in order to
protect sensitive data of users exploiting such a
system.
We formally prove that data independent gen-
eralization, subsampling, and suppression of small
clusters, make it possible to achieve privacy under
the differential privacy model.
We also assess the effectiveness of the algorithm
in detecting neutrality violations by using a large
dataset of measurements of broadband traffic by
home users. We show that a small subsampling
along with the elimination of very small clusters is
capable of providing minimal performance loss and,
at the same time, provide a good degree of privacy.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let Ni be the number of tuples of X belonging
to the same cluster i as xr. We assume that these
tuples are drawn from an unknown distribution with
probability density function fγi(x). Let Y and Z
be the number of tuples selected by the sampling
algorithm over the databases X and X\xr. Clearly
Y and Z are drawn from a binomial distribution
with parameters (Ni, β) and (Ni−1, β) respectively.
Let y1, . . . , yY be the tuples sampled from X and
z1, . . . , zZ be the tuples sampled from X\xr. We
distinguish three different cases:
1) if Y < k and Z < k, then the cluster is
removed from both databases X and X\xr.
This case is trivial.
2) if Y ≥ k and Z ≥ k, then no cluster is
removed;
3) otherwise, the cluster is removed only in one
database, in X or in X\xr.
Case 2. No cluster is removed: We prove first
the case with b = 0; the case with b = 1 is similar.
We have that A(q,X) = 0 and A(q,X\xr) = 0 if
and only if
−σ < 1
Y
∑Y
j=k yj − q < σ ∀q
−σ < 1
Z
∑Z
j=k zj − q < σ ∀q
Let SNi be the mean of independent random
variables with probability density function fγi(x)
sampled with probability β from a population of
Ni. Let fSNi (x) be its probability density function
and FSNi (x) be its cumulative distribution function.
We have:
e− ≤
∫ q+σ
q−σ fSNi (x)dx∫ q+σ
q−σ fSNi−1(x)dx
≤ e ∀q (5)
We consider the right inequality of (5), for which
we have:
FSNi (q+σ)−FSNi (q−σ)−eFSNi−1(q+σ)+eFSNi−1(q−σ) ≤ 0
(6)
Let φγi(ω) be the characteristic function of X’s
tuples and φSNi (ω) be the characteristic function of
SNi . Equation (6) can be rewritten as:
1
2pi
{∫ ∞
−∞
e−j(q−σ)ω − e−j(q+σ)ω
jω
βNiφγi
(
ω
Ni
)Ni
dω +∫ ∞
−∞
e−j(q−σ)ω − e−j(q+σ)ω
jω
Ni−1∑
j=k
φγi
(
ω
j
)j
βj(1−β)Ni−1−j ·(
Ni − 1
j
)[
Ni(1− β)
Ni − j − e

]
dω
}
≤ 0 (7)
We observe that the last term in the summation,
with index j = Ni − 1, is the largest. In addition,
we define the constant K′ as:
K′ =
β
∫∞
−∞
e−j(q−σ)ω−e−j(q+σ)ω
jω φγi
(
ω
Ni
)Ni
dω
(Ni − 1)
∫∞
−∞
e−j(q−σ)ω−e−j(q+σ)ω
jω φγi
(
ω
Ni−1
)Ni−1
dω
(8)
So we can obtain the new equation:
e ≥ Ni(1− β) +K′ ∀ Ni ≥ k (9)
A similar bound can be found for the left in-
equality of (5), but can be ignored since (9) always
provide a stricter condition.
Case 3. The cluster is removed only in one
database: In this scenario it is possible to find a
condition under which (, δ)-differential privacy can
be satisfied with the same  calculated in previous
case and with δ reflecting the probability that this
case occurs, which is:
δ = Pr{Y ≥ k, Z < k}+ Pr{Y < k, Z ≥ k}
After simple substitutions, we obtain (3).
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